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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
JAMES EARL BARTLETT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20030063-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for one count of possession or use of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37-8(2)(a)(i) (2002), in the Seventh Judicial District Court, San Juan County, the Honorable 
Lyle R. Anderson presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The trial court ruled that the search of defendant's car was incident to a lawful 
arrest. Should this ruling be reversed, where defendant fails to attack the basis for the ruling? 
Since defendant does not challenge the basis of the court's ruling below, no standard 
of review applies. 
2. Did the trial court clearly erred in finding, based on two officers' testimony, that 
defendant was Mirandized before he was questioned? 
This Court will "review the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision to grant 
or deny a motion to suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous standard.'" State v. Kohl, 
2000 UT 35,1f 9, 999 P.2d 7 (quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 n. 4 (Utah 1994)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
This appeal does not depend on the interpretation of any constitutional provision, 
statute, or rule of court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Information dated 31 October 2002 with possession or use 
of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (2002); driving on a suspended or revoked operator's license, 
a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227(1) (Supp. 2002); and 
driving without registration or certificate of title, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-la-1303(l) (Supp. 2002). R. 1-2. 
After a preliminary hearing defendant was bound over on all charges. R. 8. He filed 
motions to suppress, which were denied after an evidentiary hearing. R. 11-14, 116. 
A jury found defendant guilty on all counts. R. 103. He was sentenced to one term of 
zero to five years and two terms of 90 days in jail, all terms to run concurrently. R. 106-07. 
He timely appealed. R. 111. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On 25 October 2002, Monticello police officer Kent Rowley received a call from 
dispatch about a large green Cadillac driving fast and recklessly from the east. R. 116: 7-8. 
Officer Rowley saw the car (actually a Buick), clocked it driving 72 miles per hour, and 
stopped it. R. 116: 8-9. Defendant was driving; also in the car were his gray-haired mother, 
a tall man named Snow, three children, and a puppy. R. 116: 10. 
Officer Rowley asked for defendant's driver's license, registration, and insurance 
certificate. R. 116:61. Defendant "told him I didn't have none." R. 116:61. Defendant 
nevertheless produced an identification card (not a driver's license), a registration certificate 
in someone else's name, and a title certificate in yet a third name. R. 116: 11. The title 
certificate showed ownership signed over to defendant. R. 116: 11. 
Officer Rowley returned to his car and ran a standard driver's license and warrants 
check. R. 116: 11. The check disclosed a suspended license and an outstanding warrant. 
R. 116: 12. About this time, Officer Dalton arrived. R. 116:44-45. 
Officer Rowley returned to the car and told defendant he had been driving 70 to 75 in 
a 45-mile zone. R. 116: 61. Defendant asked if that "was a jailable offense." R. 116: 61. 
Officer Rowley told defendant that "that was the least of [his] worries, " then informed him 
of the "warrants out of Vernal." R. 116: 61-62. He then asked defendant to step out of the 
vehicle and told him he was under arrest. R. 116: 12, 61. 
1
 Except as otherwise noted, the facts are recited "in the light most favorable to the 
trial court's findings from the suppression hearing held in this case." State v. Comer, 2002 
UT App 219, f 2, 51 P.3d 55 (quotations and citation omitted). 
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According to his usual practice and out of concern for his own safety, Officer Rowley 
then asked the other two adults to get out of the car and requested all three to pull their 
pockets out so he could see if they were carrying any weapons. R. 116: 13. Snow produced 
a "brass bowl" containing marijuana residue. R. 116: 13. Officer Rowley told Snow he was 
under arrest, then took defendant and Snow back by his own vehicle and gave them Miranda 
warnings. R. 116: 13-14,48-49. 
Officer Rowley then told defendant he was going to search his car "incident to" (per 
Dalton) or "pursuant to" (per defendant) the arrest. R. 116: 33, 56, 64. Officer Rowley 
conducted the search while Officer Dalton remained with the two arrested men. R. 116:46. 
While waiting with defendant and Snow, Officer Dalton noticed that defendant 
appeared "a little bit nervous"; the officer told him, "[I]f. . . you come clean right now, it 
might go easier on ya." R. 116:49. Defendant then told Officer Dalton that Officer Rowley 
would find some crushed-up "Cross Tops" under the seat. R. 116: 49.2 
Officer Dalton walked over to Officer Rowley to tell him that he was supposed to find 
some crushed-up pills under the seat, but Rowley had already found, under the passenger's 
seat, a plastic container containing what turned out to be methamphetamine. R. 116: 16,50. 
2
 "Cross tops" are ephedrine, a legal drug. R. 116: 36. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court ruled that Officer Rowley's search of defendant's car was a search 
incident to a lawful arrest. On appeal, defendant does not address this doctrine, but argues 
that the scope of detention was not justified by the initial stop or by reasonable suspicion. 
He also argues that any consent was tainted by a prior illegality. Because defendant does not 
attack the basis of the court's ruling, his claim fails. 
In any event, the search was incident to a lawful arrest. The facts demonstrate, and 
defendant does not contest, that his arrest was lawful, that the search was contemporaneous 
with the arrest, and that the search was limited to the passenger compartment of his 
automobile. The search was therefore constitutional. 
2. The trial court did not commit clear error in finding that (a) Officer Rowley gave 
defendant his Miranda warnings, and (b) he did so before Officer Dalton questioned him. 
Defendant makes no attempt to marshal the evidence supporting these findings. Nor is his 
claim adequately briefed. It consists of three sentences and includes no citations to legal 
authority and no legal analysis. Moreover, the court's findings are well supported by the 
testimony elicited in the suppression hearing. Defendant himself testified that he received 
Miranda warnings, and both officers testified that he was warned before he was questioned. 
The trial court committed no error. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE SEARCH OF 
DEFENDANT'S CAR WAS INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST 
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILS TO 
ATTACK THE BASIS OF THE COURT'S RULING 
Defendant claims that the fruits of Officer Rowley's search should have been 
suppressed because the officer "exceeded the scope of the traffic violation," presumably 
without '"reasonable suspicion of . . . more serious criminal activity.'" Br. Aplt. at 8 
(quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994)). Defendant does not challenge 
the initial stop. Br. Aplt. at 9.3 
A. Because defendant fails to attack the legal basis of the trial court's 
ruling, this claim is inadequately briefed. 
This is a search-incident-to-arrest case. In his first statement at the suppression hearing, 
defense counsel referred to a search "incident to lawful arrest." R. 116: 5. In the course of 
the hearing, Officer Dalton testified that Officer Rowley told defendant he was going to 
search the vehicle "incident to arrest." R. 116: 56-57. Defendant testified that Officer 
Rowley said he was going to search the vehicle "pursuant to arrest." R. 116: 64. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the trial court ruled that the search was a valid search incident to 
arrest: "I think the question . . . with regard to what was found in the vehicle,... is whether 
3
 Although his brief is silent on this point, presumably defendant challenges only his 
conviction for possession of methamphetamine, not his convictions for driving without a 
license and registration. 
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there was a right to search. There certainly was a right to arrest and there is the right to 
search incident to that arrest." R. 116: 68.4 
Defendant does not attack this basis for the court's ruling. His brief does not quote the 
trial court's ruling, mention the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine, or acknowledge that the 
court upheld the search in reliance upon this doctrine. See Br. Aplt. at 8-12. He does not 
challenge the legality of his arrest. Rather, defendant argues that "the detention lasted longer 
than necessary for the purpose of the stop." Br. Aplt. at 10. He also argues that "any consent 
given was the result of an illegal detention and void," and that "[tjhere was nothing in plain 
view." Br. Aplt. at 12. 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that the argument portion 
of appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect 
to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the 
trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." 
As Utah courts have frequently reiterated, "a reviewing court is entitled to have the 
issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which 
the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." State v. Gomez, 2002 
UT 120,%20, 63 P.3d 72 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988) (in turn 
quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (111. App. 1981))). Thus, when the 
appellant fails to present any relevant authority, the reviewing court will "decline to find it 
4
 The trial court ruled in the alternative that "by the time the search actually occurred 
there was another ground for searching and that was probable cause to believe that you'd find 
drugs in the car because the passenger had been found with drug paraphernalia." R. 116: 68. 
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for him." State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, f^ 12, 69 P.3d 1278 (rejecting prosecutorial 
misconduct challenge). Similarly, "[w]hen a party fails to offer any meaningful analysis, [the 
court will] decline to reach the merits." State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, ^ 12, 52 P.3d 
467. An appellant must, in addition to citing cases, "explain why. . . the cited cases compel 
this court to reverse the district court.. ." Id. 
"Utah courts routinely decline to consider inadequately briefed arguments." State v. 
Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998) (citing State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 
(Utah 1989); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 
599, 602 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah App. 1992)). See also 
State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, ] 28,48 P.3d 872; State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, H 13, 72 
P.3d 138. 
Defendant's challenge to the trial court's ruling is inadequately briefed. Although his 
brief contains legal authority, it does not explain why the cited cases compel this Court to 
reverse the district court. Indeed, it does not address or even mention the legal ground for 
the district court's ruling. Accordingly, this Court should decline to address this issue. 
B. The search was a valid search incident to arrest 
The trial court's ruling was correct in any event. "[W]hen a policeman has made a 
lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous 
incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile." New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454,460 (1981) (footnotes omitted). "It follows from this conclusion that 
the police may also examine the contents of any containers found within the passenger 
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compartment, for if the passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will 
containers in it be within his reach." Id. "Such a container may, of course, be searched 
whether it is open or closed, since the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has 
no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the 
infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have." Id. at 461. 
"A search of an automobile and its occupants pursuant to lawful arrest are proper even 
for a misdemeanor arrest." State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1249 (Utah App. 1996), cert, 
denied9X6?2d 909 (citing State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196,1203 (Utah 1995)). "Searches 
are also proper when the purpose for the initial stop is unrelated to contraband found in the 
automobile." Id. (multiple citations omitted). 
Here, defendant concedes that the initial stop was valid. Br. Aplt. at 9. The record 
demonstrates, and defendant does not contest, that he was an occupant of the automobile, that 
he was placed under arrest, that the search was contemporaneous with the arrest, and that the 
search was of the passenger compartment of the automobile. See R. 116: 10,12-15; 37,63-
64; Br. Aplt. at 8-13. The arrest was lawful because "[a] peace officer may make an arrest 
under authority of a warrant." Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1999). Defendant agrees that 
"[o]nce the office[r] found the outstanding warrant, he was required to arrest the Defendant, 
issue a citation, or release him." Br. Aplt. at 10 (citation omitted). Accordingly, all the 
elements of a the search incident to arrest are present here. The trial court's ruling was 
therefore correct. 
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2. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CLEARLY ERR IN FINDING, BASED 
ON TWO OFFICERS' TESTIMONY, THAT DEFENDANT WAS 
MIRANDIZED BEFORE HE WAS QUESTIONED 
Defendant claims that his statements at the scene "should be suppressed either because 
he was not advised of his Miranda rights or if he did waive it was in the course of an illegal 
seizure and his consent is void." Br. Aplt. at 8; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
His entire argument consists of three sentences: 
[Defendant] denies being advised of his Miranda rights or waiving the same. 
However, even viewed in the lights most favorable to the State, he was not 
advised of Miranda until 50 minutes after Dalton arrived. Clearly any statements 
Defendants made were in a custodial interrogations setting after a lengthy 
detention. They were used against him extensively at trial. (Trial Transcript 70, 
74, 75, 95). 
Br. Aplt. at 12-13. 
A. This claim is inadequately briefed. 
"An issue is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as 
to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court." State v. Sloan, 2003 
UT App 170,1f 13, 72 P.3d 138 (citations omitted). An argument that "contains no legal 
analysis and cites no authority . . . is inadequately briefed." Id. This court will "decline to 
address" inadequately briefed issues. Id. at ^ 15. 
Defendant's argument cites no legal authority, including Miranda itself, and contains 
no legal analysis. Indeed, defendant even "fails to clearly identify which statements he 
believes should be suppressed." Orem City v. Bovo, 2003 UT App 286,114, n.3 (rejecting 
10 
Miranda challenge). The claim is therefore inadequately briefed, and this Court should 
decline to address it. 
B. Defendant fails to marshal the evidence in support of the factual finding 
he assails. 
Defendant's claim is factually based. He "denies being advised of his Miranda rights 
or waiving the same." Br. Aplt. at 12.5 He continues: "However, even viewed in the lights 
most favorable to the State, he was not advised of Miranda until 50 minutes after Dalton 
arrived." Br. Aplt. at 12-13. Thus, he argues, "any statements Defendants made were in a 
custodial interrogations setting after a lengthy illegal detention." Br. Aplt. at 13. In other 
words, defendant claims he was not warned until after he was questioned. 
This argument directly attacks a factual finding of the trial court. At the suppression 
hearing, the officers and defendant gave competing accounts concerning the sequence of 
events; the court found that "on the subject of when Miranda warnings were given, I believe 
both of the police officers that those were given at the time of arrest, and that makes all the 
subsequent statements, which were the only ones that... are the slightest bit incriminating[,] 
admissible." R. 116:69. 
"A critical requirement of appellate advocacy is the duty to marshal the evidence when 
challenging the trial court's finding of fact." West Valley City v. Hoskins, 2002 UT App 223, 
\ 13, 51 P.3d 52; accord Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must 
first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."). 
5
 However, at the suppression hearing defendant testified, "I was read my Miranda 
rights—my mother was already turnin' around in the road to take my car back to Cortez and 
they was about to place us in the car." R. 116: 67. 
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In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger 
must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists. 
After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger 
must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be 
sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the 
evidence is clearly erroneous. 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991). 
Defendant has not marshaled the evidence here. He has not cited or acknowledged the 
trial court's finding or any testimony supporting it. See Br. Aplt. at 12-13. Indeed, he has 
not even cited evidence on which he presumably relies in attacking the finding. Id. 
"Failure to marshal the evidence waives an appellant's right to have his claim of 
insufficiency considered on appeal." State v. Gallegost 851 P.2d 1185,1189-90 (Utah App. 
1993) (citing State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990)). Accordingly, 
defendant's "failure to marshal the evidence . . . allows [this Court] to affirm the court's 
findings on that basis alone." State v. Waldron, 2002 UT App 175, f 15, 51 P.3d 21 
(omission in original) (quoting State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60,^| 61, 28 P.3d 1278). 
C. No Miranda violation occurred. 
No Miranda violation occurred in any event. Defendant's claim is two-fold. First, he 
argues that he was not warned of his Miranda rights. Br. Aplt. at 12. Second, he argues that, 
even if he was, he was not warned until after he made the statements he seeks to suppress. 
Br. Aplt. at 12-13. 
Miranda warnings must precede any custodial interrogation, since "the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prohibits admitting statements given by a 
12 
suspect during 'custodial interrogation' without a prior warning." Illinois v. Perkins, 496 
U.S. 292, 296 (1990) (emphasis added, citations omitted). If and when Miranda warnings 
were given are factual issues. This Court will "review the factual findings underlying the 
trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous 
standard.' " State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35,f 9, 999 P.2d 7 (quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
939 n. 4 (Utah 1994)). 
The trial court's finding that the challenged statements were made "subsequent" to 
defendant's Miranda warnings is well supported by the evidence. R. 116:69. Officer Dalton 
testified that he spoke with defendant only after Officer Rowley had begun to search the car. 
R. 116: 48-49. Officer Rowley testified that he began to search the car only after reading 
defendant his rights. R. 116: 14-15. Therefore, Officer Dalton spoke with defendant only 
after defendant had been read his rights. In addition, Officer Rowley testified that the 
discussion of crushed-up Cross Tops and ephedrine—presumably the statements defendant 
seeks to suppress—"was all after Miranda." R. 116: 19. Further, Officer Dalton testified 
that before he discussed with defendant what Officer Rowley might find in the search of the 
car, "Rowley had already read the Miranda rights." R. 116: 48. Finally, when asked on 
cross-examination, "are you sure that none of these questions were asked, prior to Miranda 
being given?" Officer Dalton answered, "I'm positive that was after." R. 116: 57. 
The court's finding was not clearly erroneous. Therefore, even if defendant had 
adequately briefed his claim and marshaled the evidence, the claim would fail on the merits. 
13 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
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